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THE JUDICIAL FORTUNES OF FRENCH
ON THE CANADIAN PRAIRIES

DONALD A. BAILEY
Early European settlement patterns on the Canadian and U.S. prairies had many common
features. Diverse peoples settled side-by-side,
though often in distinct ethnic concentrations,
and heritage cultures and languages persisted for
several generations, even as significant assimilation to the dominant culture simultaneously
occurred. Interaction and assimilation were not
always harmonious, however, for intra-ethnic
disagreements about heritage loyalty versus assimilation and friction with the dominant or
another culture consumed many energies. Periods of war or economic crisis brought out xenophobic suspicions among the dominant and
fully assimilated groups, suspicions that sometimes led to attempts at oppressive legislative
measures that were later challenged in the courts.
Linguistic and cultural influences rioted back

and forth in a fashion remarkably similar in both
societies, whether the national myth was of the
"melting pot" of the United States or the "cultural mosaic" of Canada. 1
The Canadian experience did diverge from
the American in at least one culturally significant respect: the existence and constitutional
recognition of a second official language. In the
century and a half preceding 1900, the exploration, commercial exploitation, settled agriculture, and even the constitution of the first
new province on the prairies had been largely
the work of the French and the Anglo-Celts.
Both Euro-Canadian peoples were influenced
in these undertakings by the plains and woodlands Indians with whom many of each European heritage had intermarried. Whatever native
languages were spoken on the Canadian prairies
in the nineteenth century, French and English
were in daily use in roughly equal measure. The
courts, schools, churches, and newspapers of
the region reflected their bicultural origins, and
the early governing institutions did too. 2
The rapid expansion of immigration after
1875, however, overwhelmed the Metis and
French Canadians and swamped their constitutional safeguards as well. Constitutional guarantees or statutory provisions, respectively, for
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French and English legislative and judicial language rights and for religiously diverse schools
supported by the communal purse, were either
abrogated outright, as in Manitoba, or gradually
taken away, as in the territories that became
Saskatchewan and Alberta. German, Ukrainian, and Polish Catholics, along with the even
earlier arriving Mennonites, owed the distinctive survival of their culture in Canada in significant part to the linguistic and educational
rights that French Canadians had modelled on
the prairies. For various reasons, however, these
others came to accept the British-Canadian
dogma that the English language and nonsectarian public schools should be the country's
norms. It is therefore hardly surprising that the
twentieth century has treated French Canadians in the West as merely one of several prominent ethnic groups, valued as compatriots on
those terms, but no longer as one of Canada's
founding partners.
Prairie French Canadians did not, however,
forget their rights. Throughout the present century, they struggled to maintain their culture
through the surreptitious teaching of French in
public schools, the maintenance in Manitoba
of several confessional schools and a fine college
c/assique, continuous weekly newspapers, and
the private establishment of radio and television
stations---these last being finally assumed as a
responsibility by the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation. Then, in the 1970s and 1980s,
individual French Canadians began to trouble
prairie courtrooms by asserting that they were
not bound by laws that had not been passed in
both official languages and that they had the
right to judicial trials in French. The average
anglophone Canadian thought the arguments
were absurd and would not long survive judicial
review; today we know differently, though no
one is yet sure where the cultural revolution
will end. 3 On what rights in Canada are these
court challenges based?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

In the British North America (B.N.A.) Act,

1867, two sections form the principal defense
of either French or Anglo-Celtic Canadians
when they find themselves in the minority
within certain political jurisdictions. 4 Section
93 undertook to protect confessional schools
wherever they had been established in law at
whatever time a given province entered the Dominion of Canada. Section 133 undertook to
protect what our generation of Canadians has
come to call, sometimes reluctantly, "official
language rights." It provided that both French
and English shall be used in the records and
journals of the federal and Quebec legislatures
and in the printing and publishing of their enactments. It further provided that either language may be used in legislative debates and "by
any person or in any pleading or process in or
issuing from any Court of Canada . . . and in
or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec."
Virtually identical sections were placed in
the Manitoba Act, the constitution given in
1870 to that new province. And the same two
protections, as early amendments, eventually
entered the statute law governing the NorthWest Territories, out of which the younger prairie provinces were later formed. 5 A critical difference must be noted between the entrenched
rights of Manitoba's provincial constitution and
the merely statutory protections of the NorthWest Territories' ordinances, but in the practice
of daily life the experiences of all prairie French
Canadians have been remarkably similar.
The Canadian federation originally invested
considerable powers in the federal government,
but linguistic and other cultural rights were protected by the provinces. This division has served
fairly well in the protection of French culture
within Quebec but has not significantly helped
the federal government to protect French-Canadian minorities in other provinces because of
Quebec's fear that precedents would be set for
federal intervention concerning cultural matters in Quebec.
As Canada took over jurisdiction of ~estern
regions, considerable debate ensued about what
linguistic and cultural rights should be guaranteed. French and English were in rough bal-
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ance in Manitoba at the time that province was
created, but while immigration rapidly reduced
the French proportion there, it did not much
affect the roughly equal balance the two charter
cultures enjoyed farther west until almost the
end of the century. Although cultural balance
was protected in the statutes governing the
North-West Territories, the authority to make
changes in this area was eventually transferred
to the local legislatures, and it was in possession
of such authority that the southern regions of
these territories became provinces in 1905.
Two other peculiarly Canadian characteristics of government require brief elucidation.
First, criminal law and judicial procedures are
under federal jurisdiction, and civil law and judicial procedures are under provincial jurisdiction. The establishment and administration of
all courts in the provinces are under provincial
jurisdiction, however. In essence, only the Supreme Court of Canada is a court of the federal
government. The right to use either official language in Canadian courts has been difficult to
establish in the midst of recondite distinctions
concerning criminal versus civil law, jurisdiction over the specific court, and whether or not
use of a language be a matter of procedure.
Federal government determination might have
better guarded French rights in criminal courts
in early decades, but the tendency was to leave
the matter to the provinces, which usually responded to local expectations of single-language
dominance.
Second, until 1949 Canadian litigants had
the right to appeal beyond the Supreme Court
of Canada (established in 1875) to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council (J.c.P.c.) in
Westminster, the United Kingdom. Although
it is difficult to generalize on this point, the
J. C. P. C. saw its role to ensure provincial autonomy vis-a-vis federal intervention. On cultural issues, this tendency reinforced majoritarian
overriding of the desires of local minorities.
When such a judicial decision overturned the
Supreme Court's upholding of cultural rights in
the area of religious education in the 1890s,
federal resolve to protect provincial minorities
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was further weakened. 6
In the eastern provinces of New Brunswick
and Prince Edward Island in the 1870s, and in
Manitoba in the 1890s, the provisions for separate confessional schools described in the
B.N.A. Act's section 93 and its counterpart in
Manitoba (section 22) turned out not to guarantee the right to tax-supported funding that
the French-Catholic minorities thought they
had. Violent demonstrations in New Brunswick
resulted in a few deaths, but the court challenges ultimately failed, despite some temporary
triumphs in the Manitoba case along the way. 7
The North-West Territories' Legislative Assembly also weakened the confessional school provisions within its jurisdiction, so that the clauses
comparable to those of section 93 that were
later drafted for Saskatchewan and Alberta did
not even promise what had proven so illusory
for their predecessors.
The school question, however, is separate
from the language question, so I shall not attempt to address it here except to note that in
the spring of 1986 the Manitoba Catholic School
Trustees petitioned the federal government to
attempt once more to enforce the Order-inCouncil defied by the Manitoba government in
1895. A compromise in 1896 had exchanged
language for religion as the cultural protection
in education and had broadened its application
to new immigrant groups. French Manitobans
(along with German, Ukrainian, and Polish
Manitobans) lost that protection, too, when
the provincial government unilaterally abrogated the Laurier-Greenway compromise in
1916. I agree with Gordon Bale that Manitoban
Catholics might well win a reopening of the
judicial challenge under section 22 of the Manitoba Act;8 meanwhile interested Manitobans
await federal reaction to the petition.
ORIGINAL LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN
MANITOBA

This paper concentrates on the judicial fortunes of original language rights on the Canadian prairies. I say "original," because the
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms, entrenched in
the patriated constitution of 1982, holds out
new promises of expanded language rights in
both education and federal-government operations. These clauses are provoking additional
court challenges, which have occasionally
blended with those based on nineteenth-century provisions, but space does not permit their
discussion here.
The fortunes of original language rights in
Manitoba have been different from those of Saskatchewan and Alberta because the latters' language protections were not entrenched in their
constitutions and because the tribal memories
of their rights were not as vibrant as have been
those in Manitoba. Section 23 of the Manitoba
Act, 1870, provided for legislative and judicial
language rights. 9 The justification of these protections was the century-old presence of the
French in the region, the extensively bilingual
society throughout the first two thirds of the
century at the Red River settlement, and the
fiftylfifty French/English balance in the population. Figures are lacking for the fateful year
1890, but by 1880 the French proportion of the
population had fallen to 15.6 percent; by 1900,
to 6.3 percent, a proportion that has held rather
steady during the twentieth century. 10 Although
due in part to the unhappy exodus westward of
the Metis, the main reason for this relative decline was the rapid immigration of the period,
for in absolute numbers, the French population
grew also.
The waning of French social and political
influence, combined with the Anglo-Protestant
dogma that being British meant being English,
led to gradually increasing observations that the
English language and a single, U.S.-style "national schools" system were all that the public
resources of the province should support. An
abortive attempt to have legislative records
maintained in English only was made in 1879.
Then, in 1890, the new Liberal government of
Thomas Greenway, a majority of whose members had not been born in the area by then
called Manitoba, 11 passed the Official Language
Act and replaced the dual-school system with

a single administration for a nonsectarian educational system. Both French and non-French
Manitobans concentrated on the schools issue,
so an immediate judicial challenge over language was hardly noticed.
The Official Language Act, 1890, reads in
full:
1. (1). Any statute or law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the English language only
shall be used in the records and journals of
the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, and
in any pleadings [sic] or process in or issuing
from any court in the province of Manitoba.
(2). The Acts of the Legislature of Manitoba need be printed and published only in
the English language.
2. This Act applies only in so far as the
Legislature has jurisdiction to enact.
Notice that there is no mention of restricting
the language of debate. In the County Court of
Saint-Boniface, in 1892, Judge L. A.
Prud'homme ruled in Pellant v. Hebert that the
Legislative Assembly of Manitoba did not have
the power so to enact. When Mr. Pellant's lawyer attempted to submit documents to the court
in the French language, Mr. Hebert's lawyer
objected under the terms of the 1890 Act. 1Z
Judge Prud'homme argued that the Manitoba
Act of 1870 was an act of the Canadian Parliament, which in 1871 had been confirmed by
an act of the British Parliament. Although
Manitoba did have the right to amend its own
constitution, the right was limited to the areas
enumerated in the B.N.A. Act's section 92,
and did not include the areas described in sections 93 and 133. In fact, not even the Canadian Parliament could amend those sections,
for they bound both the federal jurisdiction and
the specified provinces "in an indivisible
sense"-as another judge was to express the same
point almost ninety years later. 13 In 1909 Judge
Prud'homme had an opportunity to make the
same ruling and to expand on his earlier arguments. 14 In both instances, however, his ruling
that the Official Language Act was ultra vires
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of the Manitoba Act was ignored by the province and its government. These early judgments
were not reported in the judicial journals and
were in fact lost for almost seventy years.
CHALLENGES TO ENGLISH-ONLY LAWS

The Forest Case. Then, on February 1976,
insurance broker Georges Forest was issued a
parking ticket outside his agency on Marion
Street in Saint-Boniface. The ticket was written
entirely in English, and Mr. Forest remembered
that five years before, when Saint-Boniface and
other municipalities were combined into an expanded City of Winnipeg, the reincorporating
act had made certain promises that the francop hone governance of Saint-Boniface would
be continued. Section 80(3) of the City of Winnipeg Act, 1971, stated that "All notices, bills
or statements sent or demands made to any of
the residents of St. Boniface community in connection with the delivery of any service, or the
payment of a tax, shall be written in English
and in French. "15 Provincial Court Judge
McTavish ruled that a parking ticket did not
qualify as a notice, bill, statement, demand,
service, or tax, but that the Official Language
Act, 1890, applied instead.
Georges Forest appealed the judgment, at the
same time deciding to challenge the 1890 Act,
too, and this round he won. In the same County
Court of Saint-Boniface over which Judge
Prud'homme had presided at the tum of the
century, Judge Armand Dureault reached the
same judgment, on essentially the same
grounds-though at the time unaware of the
earlier judgment. Judge Dureault found it perfectly in order that Mr. Forest's defense and
supporting documents had been drafted in
French. This was a preliminary ruling, and
Manitoba's Attorney General wrote the judge
that "the crown does not accept the ruling of
the Court, ... [butl does not intend to appeal
the Court's ruling ... at this time." Instead,
it wished to proceed with the "material" issues
of the case. Justice Alfred Monnin, of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, later wrote, "A more
arrogant abuse of authority I have yet to en-
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counter." When Georges Forest then asked the
government for French versions of the acts relevant to his case, the Attorney General replied
that they would be made available to him if he
would bear the $17,000 translation cost!l6
Mr. Forest's odyssey continued to have novel
convolutions, for the government's reaction had
essentially put him in the position of having to
appeal a court judgment in which he had been
the victor. He was eventually heard and again
victorious in the Manitoba Court of Appeal,
and once more, following the Government's
appeal this time, victorious in the Supreme
Court of Canada on 13 December 1979. Both
these superior courts were hesitant in the face
of what their judgments portended for the province. Thus, the judgments were "declaratory"
in nature, and ruled the 1890 Act inoperative
and without effect, while accepting Mr. Forest's
right to include French materials in his defense. 17 Nonetheless, the logic of the judgment
was that ninety years of provincial legislation
were also inoperative and without effect-about
forty-five hundred statutes and many times that
number of delegated regulations. The costs of
translation would be enormous, the personnel
of the provincial government would have to
develop a bilingual capacity, and at least a few
courts would have to be able to function in
French.
The Bilodeau Case. The new provincial government, in power since 1977, said it would
begin to address this task. It appeared to be
doing so in a desultory manner, and was condescending enough to say to the Franco-Manitoban community that the cost-free bilingual
court services being installed in Saint-Boniface
were owing to the government's liberality rather
than to a right under section 23. Almost as if
they predicted such an attitude on the part of
a predominantly anglophone society, three
Franco-Manitobans, within six months of the
Forest decision, raced down provincial highways
and attracted speeding tickets. All pleaded that
the Highway Traffic Act and the Summary
Conviction Act were invalid because they had
been enacted in English only; all three were
convicted. 18 Only law student Roger Bilodeau
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was able to pursue his case through appeals. A
political attempt to substitute a constitutional
amendment for the continuation of the Bilodeau
case precipitated a ten-month convulsion in the
province during 1983-84, but failed on account
of widespread and determined opposition. The
case proceeded to judgment, which came down
in two parts, the first on 13 June 1985 and the
second on 1 May 1986. 19
In the meantime, several governments and
private associations had received permission to
intervene in the case, for it would affect language law in Quebec and New Brunswick as
well as at the federal level. 20 In fact, in order
to focus the issue and make its resolution more
widely applicable, the Attorney General of
Canada, the Hon. Mark McGuigan, had addressed four questions to the Supreme Court,
as the government has a right to do if an issue
is important enough. Only three of the questions and answers need concern us here since
they were the burden of the decision in June
1985.
The first question was crucial, as it involved
a basic principle. Are the requirements of Canada's constitutional language provisions mandatory, or are they merely directory? Each of
the lower courts hearing the Bilodeau case had
held that section 23 was merely directory in
that, while the government was obliged to obey
its requirements, its legislation would nonetheless be valid and of full force and effect even if
it were enacted in only one language. In these
courts, the various judges agreed that Parliament had not intended legal and social chaos
to be a consequence of noncompliance. Such
chaos would indeed follow were ninety years of
Manitoban legislation to be held invalid, which
in tum would mean that the current composition of legislative and judicial institutions would
have no more legal existence. In the Manitoba
Court of Appeal, the two judges in the majority
refused to make one declaration of the law and
then to invoke the doctrine of necessity to excuse the invalidity of the past. The Supreme
Court of Canada disagreed with them, and in
doing so it substantially upheld the view of the

dissenting judge, Alfred Monnin.
The final judgment differed from those of
the lower courts in two respects. First, it argued
that the refuge of a directory interpretation was
inappropriate in the adjudication of constitutional law; constitutions entrench their provisions specifically in order that they be obeyed,
and this intention must be especially respected
where rights are concerned. Second, it again
reflected Justice Monnin's view in emphasizing
the main object of the legislation; namely, that
it intended to secure the right of Canadians in
certain jurisdictions to use either official language in legislative and judicial operations of
government. The Supreme Court wrote:
The importance of language rights is grounded
in the essential role that language plays in
human existence, development and dignity.
It is through language that we are able to
form concepts; to structure and order the
world around us. Language bridges the gap
between isolation and community, allowing
humans to delineate the rights and duties
they hold in respect of one another, and thus
to live in society. 21
This was the point missed by the lower courts
and missed as well by the Attorney General's
department in its early confrontations with
Georges Forest. They all seemed to see language
as peripheral, almost as if members of the minority were neither inconvenienced nor socially
de classed when the majority's language was expected of them. I t was as if the "material interest" were always something other than
language, and-to use the words of Sir Arthur
Channell, borrowed by others for this purpose-the "main object of the Legislature" in
entrenching language rights were some unstated
goal having nothing to do with language at all. 22
Having clearly affirmed that language was
the main object and that language requirements
were mandatory, the Court then had the difficult task of avoiding temporary legal chaos
without being unconventional or arbitrary in
how it did so. Here it had recourse to the Rule
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of Law, which, the Court wrote, depends on
two features: one, the government and its officers must be under the law, and two, the general principle of normative order, on which
civilized life depends, requires an actual order
of positive laws. Affirming the mandatory nature of section 23 put the government back
under the law; declaring the temporary validity
of the positive laws on which an orderly Manitoban society depended preserved citizen respect for the Rule of Law itself. In this manner,
the Court answered the second and third questions, which concerned the validity of laws
passed in one language only. It gave the government 120 days to submit a plan for the urgent
translation and enactment of the province's laws.
Almost one year later, the Court handed
down its decision in the Bilodeau case itself.
Drawing on its already established declaration
of temporary validity, it upheld Mr. Bilodeau's
conviction under the Highway Traffic and Summary Conviction Acts. As a second point, however, it distinguished the summons, which Mr.
Bilodeau was attempting to have dismissed, from
the issue involved in challenging those two acts.
A summons is a court order, and the court is
as free in choosing the language in which it
issues its orders as is the citizen in choosing the
language for his or her defense. While section
23 is clear that the legislature's records, journal,
and enactments shaU be in both French and English, it is equally clear, all but one of the justices argued, that either language may be used
in legislative debates and "by any person, or in
any Pleading or Process, in or issuing from any
Court of Canada . . . or in or from all or any
of the Courts of the Province." In her dissenting
judgment, Justice Bertha Wilson argued that
her colleagues failed to take into sufficient account obligations created on the state by the
entrenchment of rights for the citizen. She argued that the state's right to use either language
must yield to the citizen's right to be issued a
summons in the official language that he or she
understands.
Thus, we find that the clear and precise
phrasing of Canada's language guarantees has
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its ambiguities after all. Furthermore, the language of court orders is only the beginning. In
a mixed-language trial, are translators and interpreters adequate, or should the judge and
court personnel be bilingual? What should the
court records show: original speeches in whatever languages only, or the translations too?
What about the jury? All these questions are
currently before the courts, and, in fact, en
route to the Supreme Court. Some appeals are
flowing from Eastern Canada, but most have
been originating in the West.
Alberta and Saskatchewan Cases. Like the Forest and Bilodeau cases, and perhaps inspired by
them, court challenges to parking (Lefebvre) in
Alberta and to speeding (Mercure) in Saskatchewan flowed from tickets first incurred in the
spring of 1981. By the fall of 1984, the first of
another pair of charges had joined them, this
time initiated by criminal charges: one an accusation of robbery (Tremblay); the other, possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking
(Paquette). These four litigants desired French
copies of the legislation under which they were
charged, the right to a trial in French, the right
to a judge and jury who understood French, or
some combination of all these. 23 In Manitoba,
an improperly abrogated section of the provincial constitution had been invoked to justify
related requests. Since neither the Saskatchewan Act nor the Alberta Act, both of 1905,
said a word about official languages, on what
basis did these recent challenges seek to justify
themselves?
ORIGINAL LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN
ALBERTA AND SASKATCHEWAN

After responding to the Red River Insurrection of 1869-70, which had led to the unexpectedly early granting of provincial status to
Manitoba, the authorities in Ottawa took their
time about settling the affairs of the vast lands
that remained the North-West Territories. Although some voices urged the extension of bicultural arrangements as far as the Rockies,
which would have reflected the contemporary

146

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1989

situation for the still sparse population, other
voices urged that the West be developed as an
Anglo-Protestant extension of Ontario, These
latter voices resented the way the francophone
rebels at Red River had been conceded constitutional guarantees. Both sides were persuaded
to wait and see, so the North-West Territories
Acts of 1875 and 1886, and their respective
amending Acts of 1877 and 1891, attempted to
continue the institutions of the region and to
capture them in ordinary statute law. 24 Whenever the population in an area warranted it,
public schools were to be established for the
majority religion, while separate schools,
whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, were
permitted for a sufficiently large minority. 25 Reflecting the then bicultural population, with its
governing officials, courts, and newspapers, the
1877 amendments included provisions for the
same legislative and judicial language rights that
were protected in Manitoba.
The language provisions reappeared in the
1886 Act as section 110, but in 1891 they were
amended, after sustained pressure from the rapidly increasing Anglo-Celtic population, by a
very important proviso. The amended section
reads:
Either the English or the French language
may be used by any person in the debates of
the Legislative Assembly of the Territories
and in the proceedings before the courts; and
both those languages shall be used in the
records and journals of such Assembly; and
all ordinances made under this Act shall be
printed in both those languages: Provided,
however, that after the next general election
of the Legislative Assembly, such assembly
may, by ordinance or otherwise, regulate its
proceedings, and the manner of recording
and publishing the same; and the regulations
so made shall be embodied in a proclamation
which shall be forthwith made and published
by the Lieutenant Governor in conformity
with the law, and thereafter shall have full
force and effect. 26

The newly elected assembly wasted no time and
in January 1892 passed an ordinance, by a vote
of twenty to four, to publish the legislative proceedings in English only.27 The resolution reflected actual practice, but the ordinance itself
was reserved by the French-Canadian Lieutenant Governor Joseph Royal and was never proclaimed into law.
Thus, the North-West Territories came up
to their provincial status as legally bilingual in
official operations, even though both respect
for and memory of the language provision had
been lost for a generation. The Autonomy Acts
of 1905 carved Saskatchewan and Alberta out
of the southern third of the North-West Territories. Section 16 of each act carried forward
all laws, orders, and regulations, "so far as they
[were] not inconsistent with anything contained in [or for which there is no substitute in]
this act, . . . and all the courts of civil and
criminal jurisdiction . . . existing before the
coming into force of this Act. . . shall continue
in the said province as if [these two Autonomy
Acts] had not been passed . . . . " The section
then went on to say, however, that either the
new provinces or the Parliament of Canada could
subsequently change any previous statutes that
came within their respective jurisdictions; furthermore, the territorial courts could be abolished and replaced, so long as the proceedings
affecting criminal jurisdiction were not changed
without federal approval. 28 (This proviso merely
kept the new provinces in alignment with the
other provinces, whose criminal procedures had
been placed under federal authority in the
B.N.A. Act's section 91[27].)
HISTORY OF LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN
ALBERTA AND SASKATCHEWAN

Three quarters of a century later, prame
French Canadians wished to claim their rights
in law under the North-West Territories' section 110. It was not quite a constitutional claim,
except that the 1905 provincial constitutions
had carried forward previous legislative obligations. The new provinces could have abro-
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gated those commitments at any time, but the
court challenges advanced the case that they
had not. Since unilingual practice had been
well established more than a decade before
provincial autonomy, everyone had assumed its
legitimacy, especially if they remembered Frederick Haultain's resolution of 1892 while forgetting its nonproclamation. But the law in fact
required, or appeared to require (this was a key
point at issue), bilingual legislation, journals,
and records, while it permitted debates and judicial proceedings in either language. Would
this legal requirement be recognized and so ordered in the 1980s?
As the four language cases from Alberta and
Saskatchewan have proceeded through judicial
appeals, contemporary understanding of the legal situation has been significantly enlarged,
sometimes reluctantly. Despite the fact that the
judgments have referred to their immediate
predecessors, no one judgment has yet assembled all the elements. I propose to do so here.
The two provinces are not, in my view, in absolutely identical circumstances, but no judge
appeared to notice this until late 1986, when
Lefebvre reached the Alberta Court of Appeal. 29
The similarities between the two provinces
are, however, important. Both provinces suffered immediately from a bureaucratic error in
Ottawa that was almost as soon corrected. With
Saskatchewan and Alberta separated from them,
the remaining Northwest Territories (with their
hyphen now removed) received a set of Revised
Statutes, 190617. These omitted the amendments of ]886 and 1891 in their entirety, which
of course eliminated the section 110 contained
therein. The omitted sections may not have
been needed for the reorganized remaining territories, but because they were needed for the
legal continuity of the new provinces they were
restored within weeks by an act of Parliament
specifically for those two provinces. It is perhaps
not surprising, given the cultural assumptions
of so many English-speaking Canadians, that
some authorities have noted the revised statutes
with their omissions without noticing the restoration. 30
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A more enduring similarity is that, beginning
in 1906, both new provinces abolished the courts
inherited from the territories and established
their own. It is plausible to argue that the previous courts had been "Courts of Canada," which
are obliged to be bilingual under section 133 of
the B.N.A. Act, but which have never been
established within a province. The judges, however, have held that the courts of the NorthWest Territories were, in purpose and function,
the equivalent of provincial courts even though
they had of course been established under federal jurisdiction. 31 Thus, the replacement of the
courts, as provided for under section 16(2) of
the Autonomy Acts, did not alone and in itself
imply a shift in judicial procedures or in the
language or languages of pleading and process.
Although the provincial courts of these two
prairie provinces were not bound by section 133,
they were bound to respect their own continuity
from the territories unless it were itself explicitly
changed. Even then, they did not have the
authority to change criminal, but only civil,
procedures. The right to use French in criminal
trials appears secure, therefore, by judicial consensus, even if such agreement still seems elusive in civil cases.
Official language continuity is beset by other
considerations. One that the judges at provincial levels have overlooked is the narrow
wording of the 1891 proviso that permitted the
Legislative Assembly to regulate its proceedings
and the manner of recording the same, but
without including either enactments or court
proceedings in that permission. 32 The unproclaimed resolution of Haultain had itself spoken
only about the publishing of legislative records.
Another consideration requires rather subtle
interpretation in reading the Autonomy Act's
section 16. In a controverted elections dispute
(the case of Strachan V. Lamont, 1906), the
parties argued about whether section 16(1) applied only to "the general body of law" or also
to what Chief Justice Sifton termed "special
legislation." The majority of judges denied the
latter application on the grounds that in sections 14 and 16(3), for instance, the Autonomy
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Acts had taken the trouble to provide for certain specific ordinances and institutions of the
North-West Territories, thereby exempting them
from the generality of section 16(1).33 Applying
this reasoning in the 1985 judgment of the Mercure case, Chief Justice Bayda of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal argued that section 110's
language protections lapsed in 1905 as regards
the legislature, its records, and legislation because all this was specified as adhering to the
North-West Territories. In contrast, the language protections did not lapse as regards the
courts, for they were cited without qualification
as to the jurisdiction in which they functioned.
I find the 1906 and especially the 1985 judgments rather forced, but Justice Estey later made
a fairly good case for this view in judging the
subsequent appeal. He was overruled, however,
by the majority of his peers, Justice La Forest
concluding for the majority "that the Strachan
case was clearly and fundamentally wrong and
should be overruled." Section 16(1) of the Autonomy Acts should not be read "in a narrow
and restricted manner. "34
In at least one important respect the Saskatchewan courts' research was also rather deficient. As early as May 1906, both new
provinces had passed interpretation Acts. For
Saskatchewan, the interpretations stated, "The
expression 'Territories' or 'North-West Territories' means 'Province'." The next year, a similar act stated "the expression 'Act' means an
Act of the Legislature of Saskatchewan and also
includes an Ordinance of the North-West Territories in force in the province. "35 Alberta was
even more explicit in its 1907 amendment to
section 7(10) of its Interpretation Act, 1906:
"the said words 'Territories' or 'North-West Territories' in [any law, statute or ordinance in force
in the province]" shall be construed "to mean
and to refer to the Province of Alberta . . .
since the first day of September, 1905," wherever "it would be necessary in order to effect
the purpose of such law, statute or ordinance. "36
While Alberta courts have cited these interpretive passages, no Saskatchewan court has yet
referred to them, nor did either judge writing

for the Supreme Court refer to them despite
much attention both paid to this very point.
They appear, however, to remove any doubts
for either province about the generality of section 16, which the Parliament of Canada had
written into the Autonomy Acts, for they express a similar intention through the respective
provincial legislatures.
The provinces diverge on one significant
point. In its Statute Law Amendment Act, 1919,
Alberta added a 61st subsection to its old Interpretation Act's section 7. "Unless otherwise
provided," it said, "where any Act requires public records to be kept or any written process to
be had or taken it shall be interpreted to mean
that such records or such process shall be in the
English language." In the Lefebvre case, Queen's
Bench Judge Greschuk cited this English-language provision, but no Saskatchewan judge has
made a comparable citation for his or her province, and, indeed, I have not been able to find
such a regulation for Saskatchewan. 37
The implications of this 1919 interpretation
received appropriate attention in the Alberta
Court of Appeal. First, in his dissent, Justice
Belzil argued that English was to be the language
of record only for the operations of government,
and thus the instruction did not touch the public functioning of statutes or court procedures,
nor did it prevent the registering of wills, for
instance, in languages other than English. 38
Second, the justice argued-as did Judge La
Forest for the Supreme Court, more than two
years later-that clear statutes cannot be overruled in later legislation by mere implication
but only by express intention. Third, Justice
Belzil echoed the crucial distinction, already
made by Manitoba's Justice Monnin, that the
issue of language is not just a courtroom technicality: "Section 110, is not a mere rule of
procedure applying to specific courts; it is a general law entitling all persons appearing before
all courts from time to time constituted to use
either English or French in court. It is a right
. . . granted to persons which the courts are
required by law to respect. "39 It therefore appears that, whatever has been the situation for
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Saskatchewan, Alberta did expressly legitimize
the use of English alone in at least a narrow
area of governmental operations in 1919, despite its ambiguous period between 1892 and
1919. The principal points in dispute, however,
are not affected by the Interpretation Act, unless the Supreme Court were yet to judge the
Lefebvre case and see this matter differently.
In his excellent study for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, The
Law of Languages in Canada, Claude-Armand
Sheppard devotes careful attention to Saskatchewan and Alberta and to the question of what
obligations they may have carried forward from
the North-West Territories. The language cases
discussed in this article have occurred since that
study, so Professor Sheppard was unable to refer
to them, but the courts, conversely, appear not
to have benefitted from his analysis, at least not
until Mercure reached the Supreme Court. 40
Sheppard mentions the Alberta specification
concerning language of record and of course
cannot say the same of Saskatchewan. Sheppard
accurately describes the current linguistic practices of the two provinces, but the courts have
gone beyond his position to affirm the provinces' legal obligations toward the minority official language. In their extensive, if not yet
exhaustive, judgment, the courts have made it
clear that it was a grave evasion of the meaning
of language and intention for the two provinces
to deny their legislative and judicial obligations
toward the French language.
PRESENT LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN ALBERTA
AND SASKATCHEWAN

The 1988 Supreme Court judgment of Mercure decided the principal points for both Saskatchewan and Alberta, for there is no longer
judicial recourse beyond the Supreme Court of
Canada. Section 110 did indeed carry forward
from the old North-West Territories into the
laws and procedures of the two new prairie provinces, through section 16 of their respective
Autonomy Acts, 1905. All laws and regulations
should have been written, passed, and proclaimed in both French and English in order to
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be valid, and this obligation was as true for the
final decades of the territories as it has been
since. This requirement was part of statute law,
not constitutional law, however, and both provinces had a choice either to comply with it
without delay (which meant to translate the
statutes of a century) or to proceed immediately
to repeal section 110.
Neither province wasted time in repealing
the obligation, thereby formally breaching at
least the spirit of their premiers' undertaking
the year before, namely, to "preserve the fundamental characteristic of Canada" reflected in
the presence of French-speaking minorities in
the predominantly anglophone provinces. 41
Only time will tell how seriously they have damaged the fabric of the Canadian nation. Premiers Grant Devine of Saskatchewan and Don
Getty of Alberta argued that they were trading
the immense costs of translation against a better
value for the money they undertook to spend
on creating a bilingual capacity in their administrations. They may well prove correct, but in
the short term the symbolism of repealing section 110 offends French Canadians more profoundly than the vision of future advantages
.
pleases them.
Some issues are now clear regarding French
rights in the courts. The two provinces cannot
invade the federal jurisdiction in matters pertaining to criminal law, but civil law does lie
within their competence. Litigants retain the
right to enter pleas and documents in the official language of their choice, but they have
no right to be understood in the minority language, at least not directly. While they are entitled to have a translator present, they have
no right to demand a bilingual judge or jury or
to insist that any other person in the court,
whether an official or not, use an official language not of his or her own choice. Here the
court fell back on its earlier judgment in the
MacDonald and Bilodeau cases, unfortunate as
that opinion was for the rights of Canadian
citizens.
In MacDonald v. Montreal (May 1986), Justice Bertha Wilson certainly had the larger vision when she argued in dissent that rights for
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the citizen must necessarily entail obligations
for the state and its officials. 42 At each stage,
in virtually all the prairie cases we have been
examining, judicial vision did enlarge as appeals
reached higher courts, except when Paquette
reached the Alberta Court of Appeal in 1987.
For the most part, however, this enlargement
responded to only two imperatives: one, that
the plain meaning of the words and clear intention of the law must be taken at face value;
and two, that constitutional rights are deliberately entrenched because of their high value
and continuous necessity. On the whole, the
judges recognized the accuracy of Manitoba
Chief Justice Freedman's anticipation of disruptions, expenses, and obligations even greater
than could be immediately imagined, but they
joined him in accepting the responsibility of
going forward. 43
That acceptance had its limits in the plain
meaning of the words. Even Justice La Forest
quoted approvingly the argument of his colleague Judge Beetz in a related case from New
Brunswick: if one expects a right to be understood, one would be going "a considerable distance towards the adoption of a constitutional
requirement which could not be met except by
a bilingual judiciary. Such a requirement would
have far reaching consequences and would constitute a surprisingly roundabout and implicit
way of amending the judicature provisions of
the Constitution of Canada. "44
The Court gets stuck on the plain meaning
of the words rather than attempting to envision
a system of court procedures that would provide
clear equity. The argument is that justice before
the law, the right to a fair trial, is another issue,
one that is met by granting the constitutional
right to each person's choice of official language
and by providing the same translation service
that a litigant or witness using even a nonofficial language would be entitled to have. The
second part of the argument is that the courts'
responsibilities are limited to interpreting the
clear meaning of the law, while it remains for
legislators and the political process to determine
what those laws should be.

This issue illustrates the razor-thin edge between the limits of judicial interpretation and
the opportunities of political statesmanship. In
the words of Justice La Forest, practical exigencies are in balance with "the nature and history
of the country. . . . [R]ights regarding the English and French languages. . . are basic to the
continued viability of the nation. "45 Yet he wrote
these words as reasons for judicial restraint at
this crucial point, even though he went on to
quote approvingly the words of Chief Justice
Dickson in a related case: "Linguistic duality
has been a longstanding concern of our nation.
Canada is a country with both French and English solidly embedded in its history. The constitutional language protections [in section 16
of the 1982 Charter] reflect continued and renewed efforts in the direction of bilingualism.
In my view, we must take special care to be
faithful to the spirit and purpose of the guarantee
of language rights enshrined in the Charter. "46
The Supreme Court leaves us in the hands
of politicians for the provision of a level of judicial bilingualism that will grant equity to the
minority official language. Failing that, unless
the arguable yet narrow position of the Supreme
Court in MacDonald is eventually overturned,
nothing will prevent arbitrary governments from
deterring the use of whichever be the minority
official language in their jurisdiction through
the embarrassment that the presence of interpreters imposes on private citizens using either
of the Canadian languages.
CONCLUSION

The judicial fortunes of French on the Canadian Prairies indicate much about our legal
processes, our history, and our cultural attitudes. Both judges and historians reconstruct
the past. While their interpretative precision
depends sometimes too much on the cultural
tolerances and expectations of their society, their
judgments in tum may influence that society.
History, we know, is written by the victors,
which means that historians validate the present, whether justice or injustice, legitimate or
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illegitimate actions, disrupted the culture of the
past. Thus, an eminent historian like W. L.
Morton could write feelingly about the 1890
betrayal by the Greenway government, and
then, in the 1970s, appear quite conservative
in discussions of constitutional modifications
that might enhance French-Canadian rights. 47
As for the judiciary, we have already seen
how easily sidetracked the Manitoba Court of
Appeal was by Judge Channell's concern about
"the main object of the legislature"; nothing
could be plainer than that the constitutional
language clauses intended to protect the political use of both French and English, yet anglophone judges somehow confused that object with
the general goal of establishing an order of positive laws. Chief Justice Freedman refused to
regard the Greenway Official Language Act as
"colourable legislation," while his colleague,
Judge O'Sullivan, despite the twentieth century's ignoring of Judge Prud'homme's rulings
in 1892 and 1909, and despite the Attorney
General's reaction to the Forest judgment in his
own day, could write in 1977, "there is ... no
warrant for any suggestion that crown ministers
in this Province are unwilling to follow the law
as declared by the Courts. "48 One can only be
impressed by the care taken by the Prairie judiciary, on the whole, in reaching their conclusions, and successive judgments have
gradually restored meaning and force to our language laws. But progress is sometimes slow, and
one must be grateful for the few French-Canadian judges whose strategic presence helped
put clear interpretations in the judicial record
at early stages. The MacDonald and Mercure
decisions in the Supreme Court (1986 and 1988)
remind us, however, that ethnic origin is no
guarantee of interpretations favorable to the minority.
When the original constitutional protections, the manner of their vitiation, and the
enduring determination of the linguistic minority to enjoy their rights are brought together
under the synchronized reflections of today, one
may be pardoned if he or she hopes for a new
generosity toward the Canadian language question. As the justices observed in the MacDonald
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and Bilodeau cases, Canada's language protections were the result of a political compromise
in the 1860s; judicial interpretations appear to
have their limits in giving effective life to those
protections in the 1980s.· As events since the
launching of Georges Forest's odyssey in 1976
have shown, however, those interpretations have
significant impact on the fortunes of language
rights for the minority. Little short of a cultural
revolution is being accomplished.
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Establishment of a Supreme Court in and for the
Province of Saskatchewan" (Assented to 8 March
1907) says the following: "All rules of court in force
in the supreme court of the North-West Territories
at the time of the coming into force of this Act and
which are not inconsistent therewith shall remain
and be in force in the supreme court of Saskatchewan
until they shall be altered or annulled by any rules
of court under this Act." Section 24 of Alberta's
"Act respecting the Supreme Court" (Assented to
11 February 1907) says essentially the same thing.
36. The Alberta definitions were in "An Act
Respecting the Statutes" (Assented to 9 May 1906),
section 7(10), and "An Act to Amend the Statute
Law" (Assented to 15 March 1907), quoting from
section 1. Judge Greschuk refers to these acts in
Lefebvre, p. 502.
37. Section 30 of "An Act to amend the Factories
Act, . . . and certain other Acts and Ordinances"
(Assented to 17 April 1919). Section 27 of "An Act
respecting the Interpretation and Construction of
Statutes ... " (Assented to 14 April 1958) reiterates
the regulation to use English for public records and
written processes. Judge Greschuk refers to these Acts
in Lefebvre, pp. 502-03. The address by Judge Taylor
to the Moose Jaw Bar Association, reprinted in The
Canadian Bar Review 9 (1931): 277-83, was to mark
"the introduction of the English Language as the
language of the Courts in Saskatchewan" (footnote,
p. 277), but I cannot find any clause to that effect
in the Interpretation Acts or Judicature Acts, etc.
in the immediately preceding years. Was the change
in fact owing to a judicial decision about that time?
38. Lefebvre (5 November 1986), p. 33. It should
be noted that, although in a minority in his own
court, Justice Belzil's line of argument more closely
anticipates the majoritarian judgment of the Supreme
Court in Mercure.

FRENCH ON THE PRAIRIES

39. Ibid., pp. 331-33. See Justice La Forest in

Mercure (25 February 1988), pp. 49-55, especially
the last two pages; Justice Belzil quoted p. 329. Justice
Monnin wrote, "Also, we are not dealing with a
matter of procedure, but with one of great substance," in his dissent in Bilodeau (7 July 1981), p.
407. Writing for the majority of his court, Judge La
Forest stated that "while s.110 governs procedural
matters, it does not serve merely procedural ends. It
embodies procedural rules that give rights to individuals." In Mercure, p. 56.
40. Sheppard, Law of Languages, pp. 87-91. Professor Sheppard is incorrect in his assertion (p. 91)
that the English-record provision "does not appear
in the 1958 revision of the Act"; it is found there
as section 27. He cites the opinion of Mr. Justice
Tavender, in General Motors Acceptance Corporation
of Canada Ltd. v. Perozni (Alberta District Court,
1965) that French is a "permissive language" in the
legislature and courts of Alberta (p. 90); Judge La
Forest, in Mercure, p. 42.
41. In the spring of 1987, the provincial premiers
and the prime minister of Canada signed an agreement at Meech Lake, Quebec, to seek a further
amendment to the Constitution of Canada. I quote
from it here. Highly controversial, this "Meech Lake
Accord" may in fact fail to achieve final approval.
(I must confess that I do not see how the right to
appeal section 110 as regards the future legitimizes
all the statutes of the preceding three generations
that the judges held to be invalid by its terms.)
42. MacDonald v. The City of Montreal. Supreme
Court of Canada, Dickson c.J.c., Beetz, Estey,
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Mcintyre, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain 11. (1 May
1986), Dominion Law Reports (Fourth Series), 27
(1986), pp. 321-88. After the Reference Re Language
Rights decision of the year before, the court reserved
judgment in Bilodeau in order to deliver it at the
same time as its decision in MacDonald; the arguments for the majoriry are set forth by Justice Beetz,
a brief qualification by Chief Justice Dickson, and
an extensive dissenting judgment of Justice Wilson
by herself-all in the former decision, so that, in
Bilodeau, parallel brief judgments could be based on
the extensive arguments in MacDonald.
43. In Re Forest and Registrar (22 June 1977), pp.
453-54.
44. In Mercure (25 February 1988), p. 62, quoting
from Societe des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc.
v. Association of Parents for Fairness in Education, Grand
Falls District 50 Branch, a 1986 case reported in Dominion Law Reports (Fourth Series), 27 (1986), pp.
426-27.
45. In Mercure, p. 58.
46. Quotation from Societe des Acadiens, p. 415.
My emphasis.
47. In Morton, Manitoba: A History, pp. 246-47.
Professor J. A. Bailey, formerly a colleague of Professor Morton's at University College, University of
Manitoba, reported such a conversation to me.
48. In Forest v. Attorney-General of Manitoba, p.
421. He no doubt had in mind the contrary opinion
of Judge Dureault, in R. v. Forest, p. 717; Chief
Justice Freeman quoted from Re Forest and Registrar,
p.468.

